Abstract. We consider veri able secret sharing (VSS) and multiparty computation (MPC) in the secure-channels model, where a broadcast channel is given and a non-zero error probability is allowed. In this model Rabin and Ben-Or proposed VSS and MPC protocols secure against an adversary that can corrupt any minority of the players. In this paper, we rst observe that a subprotocol of theirs, known as weak secret sharing (WSS), is not secure against an adaptive adversary, contrary to what was believed earlier. We then propose new and adaptively secure protocols for WSS, VSS and MPC that are substantially more e cient than the original ones. Our protocols generalize easily to provide security against general Q 2 -adversaries.
Introduction
Since the introduction of multiparty computation Yao82, GMW87] , its design and analysis has attracted many researchers, and has generated a large body of results. The problem stated very roughly is the following: Consider a set of players each holding a private input, who wish to compute some agreed upon function of their inputs in a manner which would preserve the secrecy of their inputs. They need to carry out the computation even if some of the players may become corrupted and actively try to interfere with the computation. Solutions to this problem have been given in various models and under di erent computational assumptions.
One of the major components of the model is the type of adversary which is assumed. The adversary is the entity which corrupts a set (of size up to t) of players during the execution of the protocol and takes control of their actions. Two types of adversaries have been considered in the literature (barring slight variations): static adversaries and adaptive adversaries. The static adversary needs to choose the set of corrupted players before the execution of the protocol. The adaptive adversary on the other hand can choose the players during the execution of the protocol. It has been stated that the protocols of BGW88,CCD88,RB89,Bea91] are secure against an adaptive adversary under the assumption that the players communicate via secure private channels. 1 In all these results the protocols are information theoretically secure. This has led many to believe that if a protocol is designed which is information theoretically secure and is executed in a model with private channels then the resulting protocol is immediately secure against an adaptive adversary. In the attempt to further our understanding of the power of these di erent adversaries we present an example of a natural protocol (which appears in RB89]) which is information theoretically secure against a static adversary but fails against an adaptive adversary.
Another important goal in the design of these protocols is to provide protocols which are simple, so that they could actually be implemented in practice. For the case where the adversary can corrupt at most a third of the players reasonable protocols have been proposed BGW88] , but for the case where the adversary can corrupt a half of the players the existing solutions were quite cumbersome RB89, Bea91] . In this paper we present solutions for multiparty computation (and for veri able secret sharing) which are much more e cient than any existing protocol for the case where the adversary can corrupt up to a minority of the players.
More speci cally we obtain a protocol for VSS which for probability of error 2 ?k+O(logn) with n players, requires O((k + log n)n 3 ) bits of communication as opposed to ((k + log n)k 2 n 4 ) bits required by existing protocols. This improvement is based in part on a more e cient implementation of information checking protocol, a concept introduced in RB89] which can be described very loosely speaking as a kind of unconditionally secure signature scheme. Our implementation is linear meaning that for two values that can be veri ed by the scheme, any linear combination of them can also be veri ed with no additional information. This means that linear computations can be done non-interactively when using our VSS in MPC, contrary to the implementation of RB89] (this property was also obtained in Bea91], but with a less e cient information checking implementation).
An essential tool in MPC (provided in both RB89] and Bea91]) is a protocol that allows a player who has committed, in some manner, to values a; b, and c to show that ab = c without revealing extra information. We provide a protocol for this purpose giving error probability 2 ?k which is extremely simple. It allows a multiplication step in the MPC protocol to be carried out at cost equivalent to O(n) VSS's, where all earlier protocols required O(kn) VSS's.
Using methods recently developed in CDM99], our protocols generalize easily to provide security against general Q 2 -adversaries HM97].
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The transformation of such protocols to the public channel model is outside the scope of this paper, but the interested reader can refer to BH92,CFGN96].
Outline
We rst show that the weak secret sharing (WSS) scheme of RB89,Rab94] is not adaptively secure (Section 3). In Section 4, we propose an e cient implementation of information checking, and in Section 5, a scheme for veri able secret sharing (VSS) is developed. Based on these protocols, in Section 6 an e cient protocol for multiparty computation (MPC) is presented. Finally, in Section 7 an e cient protocol secure against general (non-threshold) adversaries is sketched.
Model and De nitions
In this paper, we consider the secure-channels model with broadcast, i.e. there are n players P 1 ; : : :; P n who are pairwise connected with perfectly private and authenticated channels, and there is a broadcast channel. There is a central adversary with unbounded computing power who actively corrupts up to t players where t < n=2. To actively corrupt a player means to take full control over that player, i.e. to make the player (mis)behave in an arbitrary manner. The adversary is assumed to be adaptive (or dynamic), this means that he is allowed to corrupt players during the protocol execution (and his choice may depend on data seen so far), in contrast to a static adversary who only corrupts players before the protocol starts. The security of the presented protocols is unconditional with some negligible error probability, which is expressed in terms of a security parameter k. The protocols operate in a nite eld K = GF(q), where q > max(n; 2 k ). De nition 2. A t-secure WSS scheme for sharing a secret s 2 K is a pair (Sh; Rec) of two protocols that satisfy the above properties even in the presence of an active adversary who corrupts up to t players.
De nition of Information Checking

De nition of VSS
An important protocol, which is widely used for multiparty computation, is veri able secret sharing (VSS) CGMA85]. In essence a VSS scheme allows a dealer to share a secret among n players in such a way that the adversary that corrupts at most t of the players, obtains no information about the secret. Furthermore, the secret can be e ciently reconstructed, even if the corrupted players try to disrupt the protocol. A more formal de nition is the following: A pair (Sh; Rec) of protocols is a veri able secret-sharing (VSS) scheme if it satis es a stronger correctness property, with an allowed error probability 2 ?k :
{ Correctness: Once all currently uncorrupted players complete protocol Sh, there exists a xed value, r 2 K, such that the following requirements hold:
1. If the dealer is uncorrupted throughout protocol Sh then r is the shared secret, i.e. r = s, and each uncorrupted player outputs r at the end protocol Rec. 2. If the dealer is corrupted then each uncorrupted player outputs r upon completing protocol Rec.
De nition 3. A t-secure VSS scheme for sharing a secret s 2 K is a pair (Sh; Rec) of two protocols that satisfy the termination and the secrecy property of WSS, and the above, stronger, correctness property, even in the presence of an active adversary who corrupts up to t players.
De nition of MPC
The goal of multiparty computation (MPC) is to evaluate an agreed function g : K n ! K, where each player provides one input and receives the output.
The privacy of the inputs and the correctness of the output is guaranteed even if the adversary corrupts any t players. For a formal de nition for security see GL90,MR91,Bea91,Can98,MR98].
Adaptive Security of WSS in RB89]
In this section we describe a protocol which is secure against a static adversary yet fail against an adaptive one. The example captures nicely the power of the adaptive adversary to delay decisions and due to that cause di erent values to be computed during the protocol. The protocol which we examine is the weak secret-sharing scheme (WSS) of Rabin and Ben-Or RB89,Rab94]. The attack will only work when t > n=3. It is important to note that this attack applies only to the WSS protocol of RB89] as a stand-alone protocol, and does not apply to their VSS scheme, although it uses the WSS as a subprotocol. In order to explain the attack we present a simpli ed protocol of the RB89] protocol which assumes digital signatures. It is in essence the same protocol but with many complicating (non relevant) details omitted.
WSS Share (Sh)
The dealer chooses a random polynomial f(x) of degree t, such that f(0) = s the secret to be shared, and sends the share s i = f(i) with his signature for s i to each player P i .
WSS Reconstruct (Rec) 1. Every player reveals his share s i and the signature on s i . 2. If all properly signed shares s i1 ; : : :; s ik for k t interpolate a single polynomial f 0 (x) of degree at most t, then the secret is taken to be f 0 (0), otherwise no secret is reconstructed.
The de nition of WSS requires that at the end of Sh a single value r 2 K fNULLg is set so that only that value (or NULL) will be reconstructed in Rec. Clearly, if the adversary is static then the value r is set to the value interpolated through the shares held by the uncorrupted players. This value is well de ned. If there exists a polynomial f 0 (x) of degree t then r = f 0 (0) otherwise r is NULL. During reconstruction if r was NULL then the players will set the output to NULL as all the shares of the good players will be considered in the interpolation and possibly some additional shares from the corrupted players. If r was not NULL then either the additional shares provided by the faulty players satisfy the polynomial f 0 (x) in which case r will be reconstructed. But the adversary can decide to foil the reconstruction by having the corrupted players supply shares which do not match f 0 (x), but this will only cause the players to output NULL but not another value r 0 6 = r.
Yet, we will show that under an adaptive adversary this requirement does not hold in the above described protocol. The attack for n = 2t + 1 proceeds as follows: In the protocol Sh the adaptive adversary corrupts the dealer causing him to deviate from the protocol. The dealer chooses two polynomials f 1 (x) and f 2 (x) both of degree at most t, where f 1 (0) 6 = f 2 (0), and f 1 (i) = f 2 (i) for i = 1; 2; 3. For i = 1; : : :; 3, player P i receives the value f 1 (i) (=f 2 (i)) as his share, for i = 4; : : :; t + 2, player P i receives f 1 (i), and for i = t + 3; : : :; 2t + 1, player P i receives f 2 (i) as his share. All shares are given out with valid signatures.
In Rec the adversary can decide whether to corrupt P 4 ; : : :; P t+2 thus forcing the secret to be f 2 (0), or to corrupt P t+3 ; : : :; P 2t+1 and thus force the secret to be f 1 (0). Hence it is clear that at the end of Sh there is not a single value which can be reconstructed in Rec. The decision on which value to reconstruct can be deferred by the adversary until the reconstruction protocol Rec is started.
Therefore the basic problem with stand-alone WSS is that it is not ensured that all honest players are on the same polynomial immediately after distribution. But when using it inside the VSS of RB89], this property is ensured as a side e ect of the VSS distribute protocol, hence the VSS protocol works correctly.
The Information Checking Protocol
In this section we present protocols that satisfy De nition 1 for information checking (cf. Section 2.1). They provide the same functionality as the check vector protocol from RB89,Rab94] and the time capsule protocol from Bea91]. However, our implementation of information checking also possesses an additional linearity property which will be utilized later in the paper.
The basic idea for the construction will be that the secret and the veri cation information will all lie on a polynomial of degree 1 (a line), where the secret will be the value at the origin. The dealer D hands to the intermediary INT two points on this line, and hands to the recipient R one point at a constant, but secret evaluation point . This is known to both D and R, but is unknown to INT. We will say that R will accept the secret which INT gives him only if the point which R holds lies on the line de ned by the two points he receives from INT. A general remark before we begin describing our protocols: In the following we adopt (for ease of exposition) the convention that whenever a player expects to receive a message from another player in the next step, and no message arrives, he assumes that some xed default value was received. Thus we do not have to treat separately the case where no message arrives. Protocol AuthVal(INT; R; s):
1. INT and (s 0 +es; y 0 +ey; z 0 +ez) are 1 -consistent, then their di erence and hence also (s; y; z) is 1 -consistent. By the random choice of d it follows that R will accept with probability at most 1=jKj whenever (s; y; z) is inconsistent. C. This property will follow from the fact that INT have been accepted, except with probability at most`=(jKj ?`? 2). In the application to VSS,`will be linear in n, so the error probability is at most 2 ?k+O(logn) . D. If D and INT remain honest and R is corrupt, we must show that R does not learn s ahead of time. Observe that in the authentication protocol, R learns z; z 0 ; d; s 0 + ds; y 0 + dy. Note that since D and INT are honest, R knows in advance that (s 0 +ds; y 0 +dy; z 0 +dz) will be 1 -consistent. He can therefore compute y 0 + dy from z; z 0 ; d; s 0 + ds, and this value can be deleted from his view without loss of generality. However, it is clear that z; z 0 ; d; s 0 + ds has distribution independent of s.
Linearity of the IC Protocol
In our multiparty computation protocol we would like to be able to authenticate a linear combination of two values. The setting is as follows: D, R and INT have executed both protocols Distr and AuthVal for two di erent values s 1 and s 2 . Now they wish to reveal a linear combination of these two secrets without exposing s 1 and s 2 and without carrying out any additional veri cation. This can be achieved if for both invocations of the IC protocol the dealer chooses the same value as the random evaluation point which he gives to R. Then all the properties of the protocol still hold with the addition that the appropriate linear combination of the verifcation data yields a veri cation for the linear combination of s 1 and s 2 .
IC-Signatures
In the sequel we will want to use the information checking protocol as semi \digital signatures". When a person receives a digital signature from a signer, he can later show it to anyone and have that person verify that it is in fact a valid signature. This property can be easily achieved with information checking, by carrying out the protocol with all players as explained bellow. We do not achieve all properties of digital signatures, but enough in order to achieve our goals. The IC-Signatures will be given in the following way. Protocol Distr will be carried out by the dealer D with intermediary INT and the receiver being each player P 1 ; : : :; P n , each with respect to the same value s. Next, the AuthVal protocol will be performed by INT and each player P i . Then, in protocol RevealVal, INT will broadcast s and the authentication information, and if t + 1 players accept the value s then we shall say that the \signature" has been con rmed. We shall call these signatures IC-signatures. These signature enable D to give INT a \signature" which only INT can use to convince the other players about the authenticity of a value received from the dealer. Thus, we use these IC-signatures as signatures given speci cally from D to INT, and we denote such a signature as s (D; INT).
Veri able Secret Sharing
We now present our simpli ed VSS protocol. The protocol is based on the bivariate solution of Feldman FM88, BGW88] (omitting the need for error correcting codes). The protocol will use our new variant of information checking which will provide us with high e ciency.
De nition 5. A vector (e 0 ; : : :; e n?1 ) 2 K n is t-consistent if there exists a polynomial w(x) of degree at most t such that w(i) = e i for 0 i < n.
The intuition behind the construction is that the secret will be shared using an n n matrix of values, where each row and column is t-consistent, and where row and column i is given to player P i . Thus, for i 6 = j, P i and P j share two values in the matrix. The dealer will commit himself to all the values by signing each entry in the matrix. The row determines by simple interpolation a share of a single variate polynomial. Thus, de facto the dealer has given player P i a signed share, s i . The players can now check consistency of the matrix by comparing values between them and expose inconsistent behavior by the dealer using the signatures. Hence we are guaranteed that all the values held by (yet) uncorrupted players are consistent and de ne a single secret.
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In order to also have the share of player P i signed (implicitly) by the other players, player P i gets the share b ij in his row signed by player P j . Now this in return will prevent the adversary from corrupting the secret at reconstruction time.
VSS Share (Sh) If the values are not t-consistent, P i broadcasts these values with D's signature on them. If a player hears a broadcast of inconsistent values with the dealer's signature then D is disquali ed and execution is halted. 3. P i sends a ji and a signature which he generates on a ij , aji (P i ; P j ) privately to P j . 4. Player P i compares the value a ij which he received from P j in the previous step to the values b ij received from D. If there is an inconsistency, P i broadcasts b ij ; bij (D; P i ). 5. Player P i checks if P j broadcasted a value b ji ; bji (D; P j ) which is di erent than the value a ji which he holds. If such a broadcast exists then P i broadcasts a ji ; aji (D; P i ). 6. If for an index pair (i; j) a player hears two broadcasts with signatures from the dealer on di erent values, then D is disquali ed and execution is halted.
VSS Reconstruct (Rec)
1. Player P i broadcasts the values b i1 ; : : :; b in with the signature for value b ij which he received from player P j . (If he did not receive a signature from P j in the protocol Sh then he had already broadcasted that value with a signature from D.) 2. Player P i checks whether player P j 's shares broadcasted in the previous step are t-consistent and all the signatures are valid. If not then P j is disquali ed. 3. The values of all non-disquali ed player are taken and interpolated to compute the secret.
Theorem 1. The above protocols (Sh; Rec) satisfy De nition 3 for VSS protocols.
Proof. We prove that each required property is satis ed:
2 So far, this results in a WSS which is secure against an adaptive adversary.
Secrecy. Observe that in Steps 2{6, the adversary learns nothing that he was not already told in Step 1. Thus the claim follows immediately from the properties of a bi-variate polynomial of degree t and the properties of the information checking.
Termination. From examining the protocol it is clear that the dealer D can be disquali ed only if the data which he shared is inconsistent, assuming that the players cannot forge any of the dealers signatures, of which there are O(n). Thus, an honest dealer will be disquali ed at most with probability O(2 ?k+logn ).
Correctness. First we will show that a xed value r is de ned by the distribution. De ne r to be the secret which interpolates through the shares held by the set of the rst t+1 players who have not been corrupted during Sh. Their shares are trivially t-consistent, and with probability at least 1?O(2 ?k+logn ), there are correct signatures for these shares, and thus they de ne uniquely an underlying polynomial f 0 (x; y) as well as a secret r = f 0 (0; 0). Let us look at another uncorrupted player outside this set. He has corroborated his shares with all these t + 1 players and has not found an inconsistency with them. Moreover, this player has also veri ed that his row and column are t-consistent. Hence, when this player's shares are added to the initial set of players' shares the set remains t-consistent, thus de ning the same polynomial f 0 and secret r. Now we examine the two correctness conditions: 1. It is easy to see that if D is uncorrupted then this value r = s. 2. A value di erent than r will be interpolated (or the reconstruction will fail) only if a corrupted player would be able to introduce values which are inconsistent with the values held by the honest players. A corrupted player succeeded doing it only when he was not disquali ed in Step 2. of the reconstruction procedure. This means that he was able to produce a set of n values which are t-consistent, and for each value to have a signature from the appropriate player to which it relates. Clearly, t+1 of these signatures must be from still uncorrupted players. We have already shown that these players' shares lie on f 0 (x; y), thus if the corrupted player's shares are t-consistent they must lie on f 0 (x; y) as well. Therefore the adversary cannot in uence the value of the revealed secret.
u t E ciency. By inspection of the VSS distribution protocol Sh, one nds that n 2 eld elements are distributed from D, and each of these are authenticated using Distr and AuthVal a constant number of times. Executing Distr and AuthVal requires communicating a constant number of eld elements for each player, and so we nd that the total communication is O((k + log n)n 3 ) bits, for an error probability of 2 ?k+O(logn) .
Note that in our case (contrary to e.g. BGW88]) a VSS of a value a consists not only of the shares a 1 ; : : :; a n where a i is held (in fact implicitly) by P i , it is explicitly held by P i via the subshares a i1 ; : : :; a in where a ij is held also by player P j , and P i has a IC-signature from P j on that value. This structure and the IC-signatures are required for the reconstruction. Thus, if we wish to compute the sum/multiplication of two secrets we need to have the resultant in this same form.
We will prove the following theorem in the next two subsections.
Theorem 2. Assume the model with a complete network of private channels between n players and a broadcast channel. Let C be any arithmetic circuit over the eld K, where jKj > max(n; logk) and k is a security parameter. Then there is a multiparty computation protocol for computing C, secure against any adaptive adversary corrupting less than n=2 of the players. The complexity of this protocol is O(n 2 jCj) VSS protocols with error probability 2 ?k+O(log n) , where jCj is the number of gates in C. This amounts to O(jCjkn 5 ) bits of communication.
Addition
Addition is straightforward: For two secrets a and b shared with (implicit) shares a 1 ; : : :; a n and b 1 ; : : :; b n , all the subshares, and their appropriate IC-signatures, each player P i needs to add his two (implicit) shares a i and b i which means that he needs to hold a IC-signature from P j for a ij + b ij . But this is immediately achieved as the sum of two IC-signatures results in an IC-signature for the sum of the values signed. Thus, we have computed the addition of two shared secrets.
